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From Powers to Penkovsky

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THOUGH the five-day U.S.S.R. Supreme Court trial of the Anglo-American spy Oleg Penkovsky and his British go-between Greville Wynne ended on May 11, with the death penalty for the first and an 8-year prison term for the second, the imperialist espionage and subversion agencies are still on trial—summoned to answer before the court of world public opinion.

The Penkovsky-Wynne case has given us a closer view of the imperialists' backstage operations against the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries, also an insight into the relations between the intelligence services of the Nato countries, particularly the U.S. and Britain.

It is not the first time Western intelligence agencies have tried to coordinate anti-Soviet activity. In 1918 Bruce Lockhart, British spy and diplomat, plotted with his American colleague De Witt Pool against the young Soviet Republic. On the eve of the second world war the nazi agents sought to weld the Italian, Japanese, Hungarian, Rumanian and Finnish espionage agencies into a united anti-Soviet "secret front."

Immediately after the war the Americans took up where the nazis had failed. Following CIA negotiations with the allies of the United States in May 1949 a compact was struck entitling it to maintain permanent representatives at the intelligence centres of the Nato countries and obtain from them secret political, military and economic information on the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries.

Little by little the U.S. agency established pretty rigid control over the others, a practice that was formalized at the Nato Council session in Paris in mid-December 1956. Then, when Eisenhower and Macmillan met in the Bermudas in 1957, it was decided to revive the wartime commission of U.S. and British intelligence representatives. In addition a joint centre, integrating U.S., British and Canadian military intelligence officers, was started in London. And reports appeared in the Western press that the Americans were financing certain British intelligence activities.

Who pays the piper calls the tune. Today the CIA bosses its British counterpart and rudely appropriates the fruit of its effort.

Penkovsky served two masters, the Americans and the British. But the relations between the two were far from idyllic. Barely had Penkovsky submitted his first reports to the British, than their senior partners across the water made a grab for this new source of information. The American agency suggested going halves in Penkovsky. The London cloak-and-dagger men were obliged to agree. In this manner was an Anglo-American consortium formed to exploit what the respective espionage chiefs took to be a gold mine for them.

It emerged at the trial that the Americans were galled by the fact that Penkovsky passed on [illegible] his rolls of film and information to the British and they decided to "pull a fast one" on their junior partners, as Lt. Gen. Artyom Gorny, the Prosecutor, put it. Accordingly, they arranged a separate clandestine rendezvous with Penkovsky in Paris in September 1961 when he was there on business.

Closeted with Penkovsky in a Champs Elysées hotel room, two American agents, known as Alexander and Oslaf, and a "high-ranking U.S. intelligence officer," deplored having to "share" him with the British, and assured him that they valued him more than the Intelligence Service did. CIA chief John McCone had already been told about him, they said, and was prepared to meet him should he ever come to the United States. The interesting point is that they asked him to keep this meeting secret from the British.

As Penkovsky had no objections, Washington's cloak-and-dagger men proceeded to elbow out their British opposite numbers. They put forward the argument that the personal contact the British maintained with Penkovsky via Wynne and Mrs. Janet Ann Chisholm was "unreliable" and should be abandoned in favour of communication via caches.

The British being unable to take exception to this, the Americans suggested their own Moscow cache, in the hallway of 5/6 Pushkin Street, a liaison arrangement serviced solely by American agents: Alexis Davison, Assistant U.S. Air Attaché; William Jones, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy; Hugh Montgomery, Attaché, and Richard C. Jacob, Embassy official.

The British, incidentally, gave their senior partners a taste of their own medicine. At a rendezvous with

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Penkovsky, they told him they had a better information analysis centre than the U.S. agency and therefore it would be best if the more valuable information went to them.

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The backstage squabble between the allies over the traitor Penkovsky is not the only instance of discord between the two secret services.

A few illustrations from the recent past.

When the British tried to conceal their first atomic secrets from Washington, McCone's predecessor, Allen Dulles, sent two special aircraft to the jealously-guarded British nuclear-test area in South-West Australia. The Americans were about to pat themselves on the back at their success when chance intervened. One of the planes had to make a forced landing in Australia—with the result that the British learned of the CIA's manoeuvre.

It was disclosed in the Western press that the Americans had also got information about the secret British thermonuclear Zeta installation without the knowledge and contrary to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

The Moscow trial demonstrated once again that though in accord on their central objective of brewing war against the socialist world, on many other things the reactionary U.S. and British ruling circles are at bitter odds. The less experienced but numerous and lavishly subsidized American secret service is rudely treading on the corns of the much more experienced British cloak-and-dagger experts.

One more sidelight. The Western intelligence services must really be badly off for agents in the Soviet Union, if they had to share one and the same spy! They must be in desperate want of information on Soviet scientific research if the American radio station at Frankfort-on-the-Main broadcast instructions night after night, and well-nigh half the U.S. and British diplomats in Moscow eagerly awaited the signal of three puffs in their telephone receivers.

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The State Prosecutor emphasized at the trial that the British and American secret services were particularly interested in classified information on Soviet defences. This was also noted in the Western press. Writes the Austrian Die Presse: "... the efforts of the intelligence agencies were directed mainly towards abolishing the Western lag."

The Pentagon and the British Imperial Staff do indeed persistently seek opportunities to discover the design of Soviet military hardware—which is one more, though indirect, proof that the U.S. and Britain are eager to get such information. Not relying on the efforts of their own scientists and engineers, Washington and London banked on the CIA and the Intelligence Service to succeed at last in stealing important Soviet secrets.

Soviet people are naturally worried as to the amount of damage Penkovsky did to our defences. What did he betray to the American and British agents?

The traitor did of course do considerable harm to the Soviet state. As is stated in the verdict, "much of the information which Penkovsky passed over to the British and American secret services and which he had prepared to pass over was of a secret and top-secret order, and part of it was state and military secrets of the Soviet Union."

Penkovsky told the Court that though the espionage chiefs in London had willingly accepted his information, they had complained that it was of too general a nature. Now, though he may merely have been trying to reduce his burden of guilt, we may logically assume that the American and British agencies really did not get from him all the information they wanted. Otherwise, why should they have insisted that Penkovsky stay on in the U.S.S.R. and continue his spying after he told them in January 1962, in a blue funk, that he was sure he was being watched and would like to get out quick?

But the cloak-and-dagger men from the Thames and the Potomac did not smuggle Penkovsky out in either a submarine or a plane, as they had repeatedly promised. Instead they tried to allay his fears and persuade him to go on spying.

"They needed Penkovsky here in the Soviet Union," Lt. Gen. Gorny remarked at the trial. "Of what use could he have been to them in Britain, even if dressed up as a British or American colonel?"

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As is only natural, the Anglo-American press is trying to minimize the scale of the fiasco but even many American newspapers (the New York Times, for one) are obliged to admit that the exposure of Penkovsky and Wynne is a bad blow, comparable to the U-2 spy plane flop of 1960. Then, three years ago, the American secret service had put its money on Powers. Now, in conjunction with the Intelligence Service, it had staked on Penkovsky.

The thing is that some ten or twelve years ago the CIA suffered a

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series of grave setbacks. Its secret agents were voluntarily surrendering to the security organs in the socialist countries in increasing numbers.

This led Allen Dulles, director of CIA at the time, to put forward a new "concept": since human beings were unreliable, shift to the use of the latest scientific and technical achievements, for machinery had no "nerves," would not surrender, or betray, trick, or let down its user.

According to the Hamburg Spiegel, one day in 1955 Dulles called an urgent conference of his immediate subordinates. From the old-fashioned armchairs in the CIA director's office its few participants cast curious glances at the miniature model of a weird-looking aircraft with a short body and unusually long wings, standing on the table. This was the notorious U-2 spy plane.

Dulles told his subordinates that President Eisenhower had approved an "unintermittent espionage" programme and ordered perimeter flights of spy planes around the U.S.S.R. to be started at once, and preparations to be made for high-altitude incursions into Soviet air space. He then explained the special-purpose Lockheed U-2 and WV-2E aircraft. The first was intended for incursions into foreign air space; the second, a slow-moving four-engine turboprop plane carrying enough fuel for a 24-hour flight, was to be used on perimeter flights along foreign frontiers for radar reconnaissance.

That the Eisenhower-Nixon administration placed great hopes in aerial espionage was confirmed by Secretary of State Herter in 1960: "The U-2 programme was an important and efficient intelligence effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this programme would have [illegible] consequences [illegible] considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved."

The "unintermittent espionage" system went up in smoke when a Soviet rocket brought down the U-2 near Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960. The American spy chiefs had to revert to the tiresome and—alas!—much less effective use of "unreliable human material."

This McCone, the man who replaced Dulles as CIA chief in April 1961, did. The idea of trusting to "able spies" smuggled into the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries seemed to be paying off when British and American agents had the "good fortune" to hook Penkovsky.

McCone took this as proof that his idea was right. Too hasty a conclusion! Penkovsky was only a *chance* stroke of good luck. His exposure was an *inevitable* sequel.

The Penkovsky-Wynne case places squarely before the imperialist espionage agencies the uncomfortable fact of repeated fiascos in their subversive activities against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. There isn't a trick they haven't tried in their crusade against socialism—plots, sabotage, the smuggling-in of spies, the recruiting of agents, aerial, electronic, radio and other technical means of spying—nothing has been "failure-proof."

They tried sending in agents recruited from among DPs. The agents were either caught, as were the spies F. Sarantsev and A. Osmanov, who in 1951 sneaked into Moldavia, or themselves surrendered, as did A. Novikov in 1955.

They were about to congratulate themselves on successfully tapping some of the Soviet army group com[illegible] in Germany when the Altglienicke spy tunnel collapsed on them in 1956.

They tried to use foreign tourists—again to no avail. The American spy-tourists Robert Christner, Marc Kaminsky, Harvey Bennett and many other clandestine CIA and Intelligence Service agents were caught red-handed.

Currently Western newspapers and magazines are arguing the question of which establishment suffered the greater defeat in the Penkovsky case—John McCone's office or the Intelligence Service (its chief's name is traditionally shrouded in mystery). London's News of the World frankly thinks the Americans are to blame for the fiasco and other papers subtly point out that there have been few cases in British intelligence history of a windfall such as Penkovsky was to them coming a cropper so soon.

Particular significance attaches in this connection to the Supreme Court Military Collegium's supplementary statement on the group of ten American and British secret service agents—five Americans and five Britons—who engaged in espionage against the U.S.S.R. under diplomatic cover. Mr. Dean Rusk and Lord Home can hardly be feeling thankful now to John McCone for the "good turn" he has done the diplomatic services of the two great powers.

Discussing the trial between court sessions, Western newsmen suggested that the Penkovsky case may have the same repercussions for McCone as the U-2 affair had for Dulles.

That is a prediction that can be left to its authors to speculate on. The important point for us is that the organizers of the "secret war" against the Soviet Union have suffered one more debacle.

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